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Abstract: Pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an agent believes 
that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite the fact that 
their public behavior is identical. I argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are 
epistemically irrational. I accomplish this, first, by rebutting a recent argument for the rationality 
of pluralistic ignorance. Next, I offer a defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of 
pluralistic ignorance. Third, I examine a type of case in which the pluralistically-ignorant agent’s 
belief is irrational, despite the fact that this belief lacks a defeater. Finally, I consider instances of 
pluralistically-ignorant agents whose beliefs are not irrational, but explain why such cases are not 
problematic for my main thesis. This critical discussion allows me to offer an important 
amendment to an extant account of pluralistic ignorance. 
 
 Pluralistic ignorance has received much attention in recent years in formal and social 
epistemology. Roughly, pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an 
agent believes that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite 
the fact that their public behavior is identical.1 Bjerring et al. (2014) argue that agents in 
situations of pluralistic ignorance can be and often are epistemically rational. In this paper I 
argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational. In order 
to show this, I first explicate the account of pluralistic ignorance that Bjerring et al. offer. Next, I 
respond to their argument for the rationality of pluralistically-ignorant agents. Third, after 
 
1 See Bicchieri (2006, pp. 186-188).  
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arguing that their account of pluralistic ignorance neglects a crucial feature, I offer a defeat-
based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance that draws on this 
feature. Next, I examine an objection derived from the work of Miller and McFarland (1987, 
1991) that claims that pluralistically-ignorant agents do not hold a defeated belief. Finally, I 
respond to an objection that claims that pluralistically-ignorant agents are not necessarily 
irrational. 
1 Bjerring et al. on Pluralistic Ignorance 
To get a better grasp of the phenomenon, it will help to start with some examples. Drawing from 
examples in the literature on pluralistic ignorance, Bjerring et al. (2014, p. 2448) present the 
following paradigmatic cases: 
Classroom Case 
A teacher has just finished presenting some difficult material in class and asks the 
students whether they have any questions. Although each student does not fully 
understand the material, no one asks a question. Based on the observation that no student 
in the class asks a question, each student believes that everyone but him believes that [ 
P] the material was not difficult. To avoid being publicly displayed as the only one who 
did not understand the material, no student dares ask a question. 
College Drinking Case 
A group of freshmen students have just arrived at their new dorm. At the inauguration 
party, each student drinks excessively, although each student in fact believes that [P] 
drinking is not enjoyable. Upon observing the excessive drinking of others, however, 
each student forms the belief that everyone but him believes that [ P] drinking is 
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enjoyable. To avoid being publicly displayed as the boring one, every student continues 
to drink excessively at the party. 
Emperor’s Case 
In Hans Christian Andersen’s fable “The Emperor’s New Clothes” (1837), we meet two 
impostors who sell imaginary clothes to an emperor. They claim that those who cannot 
see the clothes are either not fit for their office or just truly stupid. In fear of appearing 
unfit for his office and truly stupid, the emperor—as well as everyone else—pretends to 
be able to see the garment. Yet, everyone believes that [P] the emperor is in fact naked. 
Based on the observation that everyone acts as if the emperor is dressed, however, each 
person forms the belief that everyone but him believes that [ P] the emperor is dressed. 
To avoid being publicly labelled as someone who is unfit for his office or truly stupid, 
everyone pretends that the emperor is dressed—except for the little boy who after a while 
cries out: “but the emperor has nothing on at all!” 
 With these sorts of examples in mind we can provide a more formal characterization of 
pluralistic ignorance. Perhaps the most formal and detailed characterization of the nature of 
pluralistic ignorance comes from Bjerring et al. (2014). Consequently, their account can serve as 
a nice starting point for discussing the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance. In light of 
the above cases, Bjerring et al. take pluralistic ignorance to characterize social situations in 
which “group[s] of individuals all have the same attitude toward some proposition or norm, all 
act contrary to this attitude, and all wrongly believe that everyone else in the group has a certain 
conflicting attitude to the proposition or norm” (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2446). More specifically, 
after examining three other accounts and finding them wanting, they propose (Bjerring et al. 
2014, p. 2558): 
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 (PI) “Pluralistic ignorance” refers to a situation where the individual members of a group 
 (i) all believe some proposition P; 
 (ii) all believe that everyone else believes  P; 
 (iii) all act as if they believe  P; 
 and where 
 (iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their belief that the latter 
 believe  P.2 
 My question is whether the belief in (ii) is epistemically rational.3 Bjerring et al. make the 
case that it can be and often is epistemically rational for agents to conform to condition (ii).4 In 
the following section I’ll consider their argument for this claim. 
2 Bjerring et al.’s Defense of the Epistemic Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance 
Why might one think that the belief in (ii) is epistemically rational? In attempting to establish the 
possibility that pluralistically-ignorant agents are epistemically rational, Bjerring et al. (2014, p. 
2463) consider the following question: “[W]hich epistemic factors can help explain why an agent 
ignores—or at least assigns a very low credence to—the possibility…that other agents in the 
social group, like him, do not reflect their private beliefs in their public behavior?” They take it 
that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance have two main items of evidence concerning 
what others in the group believe. First, agents have observational evidence: they are observing 
others act as if they believe  P (e.g. that drinking is enjoyable). Second, agents know from 
 
2 For the sake of clarity, (PI) is a slightly amended version of their (PI4). 
3 Like Bjerring et al., I’ll take “epistemically rational” to be synonymous with “epistemically justified.” 
4 They also argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance may be pragmatically and all-things-
considered rational.  
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simple reflection that they themselves are acting contrary to their belief that P (e.g. that drinking 
is not enjoyable) and that it’s possible that other people are doing the same. Bjerring et al. 
describe the latter as introspective evidence. So in order to determine whether the agent’s belief 
that others believe that  P is epistemically rational, we need to ask “whether the agent’s 
observational evidence outweighs his introspective evidence. If it does, we have an explanation 
of why the agent…has epistemic reasons to ignore the possibility that the actions of others do not 
truly reflect what they believe” (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2464). 
 Bjerring et al. hold that there are cases where an agent’s observational evidence 
outweighs her introspective evidence. They say, “In most cases of pluralistic ignorance, it seems, 
an agent has indeed good epistemic reasons to give more weight to his observational evidence 
than to his introspective evidence” (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2464). They think the College 
Drinking Case is just such an example (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2464): 
In standard cases such as the College Drinking Case, agents lack any observational 
evidence for seriously doubting that the group’s behavior does not reflect what each 
member in the group in fact believes. In the College Drinking Case, there is no striking 
conflict between the agent’s belief that drinking is not enjoyable, his observations of the 
group’s behavior, and his higher-order belief that everyone but him finds drinking 
enjoyable. Rather, the agent’s observations of the excessive drinking in the group makes 
it epistemically rational for him to maintain the higher-order belief in question. If so, it is 
sensible to hold that the agent’s observational evidence outweighs his introspective 
evidence in these sorts of cases…5 
 
5 Bjerring et al. allow that examples such as the Emperor’s Case will likely make agents who continue to be 
pluralistically-ignorant epistemically irrational. The reason is that, in addition to their introspective evidence that 
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 This argument fails, though, because it does not acknowledge that some evidence is 
capable of epistemically undercutting other evidence or beliefs. When an item of evidence 
functions in this way, it acts as an undercutting defeater, a “reason[ ] to question whether your 
evidence or reasons or grounds for a belief actually indicate that the belief is true” (Bergmann 
2006, p. 159). Bjerring et al. appear not to countenance undercutting defeaters. However, we can 
see why undercutting defeaters should be acknowledged by contrasting two examples, one in 
which two competing sets of evidence are on a par, and another in which one set of evidence 
defeats a competing set. For the first case, suppose that, Lisa, one of my colleagues, tells me that 
it’s raining out. Another, Aldo, tells me that it’s not. In coming to a conclusion about whether it’s 
raining on the basis of this information, epistemic propriety might require that I simply weigh the 
testimony of Lisa against that of Aldo. But consider another case, one in which I visit a furniture 
store, seem to see a red table in front of me, and, on the basis of that visual experience, form the 
belief that there is a red table before me. A minute later I’m told by a sales clerk that there is 
actually a red light shining on the table that I’m looking at. Unlike the first case, this case 
involves defeating evidence: the testimony of the sales clerk is an undercutting defeater of my 
observation-based belief that the table in front of me is red. Consequently, upon receiving this 
testimony, I can no longer rationally believe that the table is red; the new evidence disqualifies 
the old, rendering it epistemically impotent, unlike in the previous case. As I’ll argue below, 
 
they act as if they believe  P, though they believe P, and that others may well be doing the same, they have 
observational evidence that the emperor is naked. This, combined with the thought that other people’s perceptual 
faculties are working properly, gives the agent a strong reason to deny that everyone else believes that the emperor 
is clothed. Such an agent cannot be epistemically rational in continuing to be pluralistically-ignorant. 
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many cases of pluralistic ignorance involve agents who have an irrational belief due to 
undercutting defeater. 
 3 A Defeat-Based Argument Against the Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance 
My argument against the epistemic rationality of agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance 
draws on a feature of these situations not mentioned in (PI). The latter account is importantly 
incomplete in that it does not recognize that, as in the examples from Bjerring et al. and those in 
the wider literature on pluralistic ignorance, non-conformity on the part of pluralistically-
ignorant agents is potentially costly. That is, agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance act as if 
they believe  P because there is a perceived risk associated with acting on their actual belief 
that P. This perceived risk varies from one case to another, but it concerns the potential social 
cost of actions that reflect the agent’s frame of mind. The classic cases of pluralistic ignorance 
discussed in Prentice and Miller (1993), Miller and McFarland (1987, 1991), Kauffman (1988), 
Matza (1964), Schanck (1932), Katz and Allport (1931), and Andersen (2000) all have this 
feature.6 Consider a couple examples. Bjerring et al.’s College Drinking Case involves students 
who act as if they like drinking “to avoid being publicly displayed as the boring one” (2014, p. 
2448). Kauffman (1988, p. 246-248) finds that many prison officers occasionally have 
sympathetic attitudes toward inmates, but disguise these attitudes by adopting a cold and 
indifferent façade on the job. The reason they adopt this façade is, in part, that they fear rejection 
from their fellow officers if they show sympathy toward inmates. Another reason that (PI) is 
inadequate concerns the fact that pluralistic ignorance is commonly recognized as an explanation 
for the existence and persistence of unpopular social norms. Unlike (PI), an account of pluralistic 
 
6 Note that while Andersen (2000) doesn’t describe his story as a case of pluralistic ignorance, it is taken as a 
standard example by, e.g., Bicchieri (2006) and Bjerring et al. (2014). 
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ignorance that acknowledges that agents face potential social costs when deciding whether to 
conceal their belief that P is able to do this explanatory work. Thus, the following revised version 
of (PI) is a more accurate account of pluralistic ignorance: 
 (PIʹ) “Pluralistic ignorance” refers to a situation where the individual members 
 of a group 
 (i) all believe some proposition P; 
 (ii) all believe that everyone else believes  P; 
 (iii) all act as if they believe  P because of a perceived potential social cost; 
 and where 
 (iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their belief that the latter 
 believe  P. 
 The following example, which is similar to the Emperor’s Case, provides a dramatic 
illustration of a situation in which the perceived risk of acting on one’s beliefs is especially 
elevated: 
Dictator Case 
Dictator has a cabinet of 30 advisors. Dictator has selected his advisors for the purpose of 
providing input in various matters concerning the operations of the state.  He is known to 
treat advisors with whom he disagrees with great cruelty, sentencing some of them to 
death. Recently, Dictator has aired a policy idea to his advisors. Advisor A believes that 
[P] Dictator’s policy is unsound, but is quick to voice support for it in meetings, much 
like the rest of A’s fellow advisors. Based on their outward behavior and positive 
statements about Dictator’s policy, Advisor A believes that everyone but her thinks that 
[ P] the policy is sound. 
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Is Advisor A’s belief that everyone but her agrees with Dictator epistemically rational? Recall 
that she formed this belief by observing the pro-policy behavior of her fellow advisors. Given 
this fact, it seems that the rationality of her belief is undermined by an undercutting defeater. 
After all, she believes 
 B: Everyone else believes that [ P] Dictator’s policy is sound. 
But she has a reason to think that the ground of this belief (observations of other people’s 
behavior) is not a reliable indicator of truth under the circumstances. That is, she has good reason 
to believe 
 D: My fellow advisors would act as if they believe that  P whether or not they actually 
 do. 
Advisor A’s support for D is strong because, she realizes, if the other advisors are anything like 
her, they wish to avoid the high risks of speaking out. While under normal circumstances 
Advisor A would rationally take people acting as if  P to be evidence that they in fact believe  
P, she cannot rationally do so here. The reason is that she is well aware of the fact that an advisor 
who believes that P would have a very good reason to misrepresent what they believe in order to 
save their neck. Note that this diagnosis is not mere speculation on her part, for all she needs to 
do is attribute to others the kind of practical reasoning she herself performed. Assuming that 
Advisor A has no reason to doubt that other advisors are rational and care about their well-being, 
her belief that B is epistemically irrational. 
 Many instances of pluralistic ignorance conform to this characterization of the Dictator 
Case: the risk of acting in accordance with one’s belief that P is high enough to warrant the belief 
that others reasoned in the same way and decided to act as if they believe that  P. However, not 
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all instances of pluralistic ignorance are such. Take the Classroom Case. The student believes 
that 
 B2: Everyone else believes that [ P] the material was not difficult.  
Unlike in the Dictator Case, it seems the student doesn’t have a compelling reason for thinking 
that the ground of this belief (observations of other people’s behavior) is not a reliable indicator 
of truth under the circumstances. That is, he doesn’t have a good reason to believe 
 D2: My fellow classmates would act as if they believe that  P whether or not they 
 actually do. 
Again, contrasting this case with the Dictator Case, Advisor A (like most of us) has very good 
reason to believe that very few people would be willing to risk their lives over a simple public 
policy disagreement.  Thus, her evidence for D is strong. In contrast, the student (like most of us) 
does not have good reason to believe that his classmates would be unwilling to accept the 
possible social costs associated with displaying their ignorance. For all the student knows, his 
classmates are willing to tolerate the possible social costs, such as embarrassment or disapproval 
for interrupting the lecture, if it means advancing their own learning. Thus, his evidence for D2 
is fairly weak. If so, his belief that B2, if it is epistemically irrational at all, is not so for the same 
reason that Advisor A’s belief that B is irrational. 
 Nonetheless, I think the student, like Advisor A, ought to withhold judgement regarding 
his belief that B2. In other words, both B and B2 are irrational to believe. The reason B is 
irrational for Advisor A is that she has an undercutting defeater for B. The reason that B2 is 
irrational for the student, however, is not that he, like Advisor A, has a reason to think that his 
evidence for B2 is misleading. Rather, the reason is that he cannot rule out the non-remote 
possibility that his evidence for B2 is misleading. Consider the student’s evidence for B2. On the 
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one hand, he observes his classmates acting as if  P. On the other, he knows that he himself is 
acting contrary to what he believes. This latter, introspective evidence raises the non-remote 
possibility that the student’s evidence for B2 (his observations of others’ behavior) is misleading. 
After all, the student knows that his own behavior is misleading in this scenario. Assuming he 
has no reason to think he is unique in this regard (we’ll examine this assumption further in the 
next section), it is an open question whether or not the behavior of his peers regarding P is 
misleading or not. 
 If there is a non-remote possibility that his evidence for B2 is misleading, then the student 
should suspend judgement regarding B2. Consider a version of the example offered in the 
previous section. Suppose that, after having formed a belief that the table before me is red (on 
the basis of my visual experience) and before I encounter the sales clerk, I read the price tag 
attached to the table, which says at the bottom, “Note that this table may not be colored as it 
appears. This store occasionally switches to non-ordinary lighting colors throughout the week.” 
Assuming there is no immediate way for me to tell whether the lighting conditions in the store 
are ordinary or not, I should withhold belief regarding the color of the table. And this is so even 
though I don’t have enough evidence to think that my visual experience as of a red table is 
misleading, just that it’s a non-remote possibility that it’s misleading. Things are similar in the 
Classroom Case. Given that it’s a non-remote possibility that the behavior of his peers regarding 
P is misleading, the student ought to refrain from believing (on the basis of his observations of 
his peers’ behavior) that his peers believe that  P. The rational thing for him to do, like Advisor 
A, is to suspend judgement regarding B2. 
 These considerations generalize to other standard cases of pluralistic ignorance. In some 
of these, such as the Dictator Case, the agent has a reason to think that her observational 
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evidence concerning what others believe is misleading. In these cases, agents have an 
undercutting defeater for their belief that others believe that  P (mentioned in (ii)). Other cases 
are like the Classroom Case: while agents don’t have a reason to think that their observational 
evidence is misleading, their belief that others believe that  P is still irrational because there is a 
non-remote possibility that their observational evidence is misleading. This non-remote 
possibility is present because the agent knows that her own behavior regarding P is misleading. 
Unless she has a reason to think that she is unique in this regard, reflection on her own case 
raises the non-remote possibility that the behavior of her peers is similarly misleading. But if so, 
then her belief that everyone else believes that  P is irrational. So, pluralistically-ignorant 
agents are not rational in believing (as they do in (ii)) that everyone else but them believes  P. 
 So, I am arguing that the rational doxastic attitude for an agent in a situation of pluralistic 
ignorance to take is that of withholding. But it might be objected that pluralistic ignorance, 
intuitively understood, could still obtain if agents adopted that attitude. That is, we could still 
have a case of pluralistic ignorance on our hands even if conditions (ii) and (iv) of (PIʹ) were not 
met. For example, the student in the Classroom Case believes the lecture was difficult and, due 
to the threat of potential social costs, acts as if he thought it wasn’t difficult. Would the situation 
be much different if we simply added that, on reflection, the student did not take the actions of 
others as strong evidence for what they believe about the lecture and, thus, refrained from 
believing that his classmates thought it difficult? After all, the student might still act in a way 
that conceals what he actually thinks about the lecture because he is unsure if others will share 
his assessment (even if he doesn’t form the belief that they won’t). 
 However, while this is an interesting scenario and may be worth further study, it should 
not be classified as a case of pluralistic ignorance. The idea that subjects believe that others 
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disagree with them (not just believe that they might disagree) is indispensable to the concept of 
pluralistic ignorance, as it is generally understood. Halbesleben and Buckley (2004, p. 126), in 
their examination of the history of the study of the phenomenon, understand pluralistic ignorance 
as a “social comparison error where an individual holds an opinion, but mistakenly believes that 
others hold the opposite opinion.” Other general characterizations in the literature also mention 
agents holding a mistaken view or having a misperception about what other agents believe. 
Interest in studying what is now called pluralistic ignorance grew out of Allport’s (1924) work 
on the illusion of universality of opinions, “the tendency of individuals to believe that opinions 
are universally held by members of a social group” (Halbesleben and Buckley 2004, p. 128). An 
early detailed treatment of pluralistic ignorance is that of Katz and Allport (1931), which found 
that a majority of students in their study believed that racial minorities should be admitted to 
fraternities, but (mistakenly) believed that others would not agree (Halbesleben and Buckley 
2004, p. 128). Schanck (1932) explored the religious and ethical views of residents in a small 
community with a large Methodist presence and found that residents tended to think, with 
respect to a number of issues, that the others residents held more conservative views than they 
did. Discussions of pluralistic ignorance, from the start, have been concerned to study a believed 
self/other divergence in opinion. Cases where agents withhold, by contrast, don’t involve any 
doxastic commitment on the part of the agent concerning whether her views differ from those of 
others in the group. For this reason, they should be classified differently. 
 Another reason not to treat cases of withholding as cases of pluralistic ignorance is that 
the two phenomena likely have distinct consequences. For example, in cases involving alcohol 
consumption among college students, Prentice and Miller (1993) found that subjects who 
mistakenly believed their peers to be more comfortable with drinking than themselves 1) felt 
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alienated as a result of thinking their views diverged from the norm (both males and females); 
and 2) felt pressure to change their views over time to align with what they took their peers to 
believe about drinking (males). While I know of no literature that has directly studied what might 
result if a student simply withholds judgment about what their peers believe, it seems that in 
general these two consequences would be significantly less likely to result. For example, the 
work of Schroeder and Prentice (1998) points in this direction. The former examined the effects 
on subsequent drinking behavior of educating incoming college freshmen about pluralistic 
ignorance. The students who participated in the study were divided into two groups, one which 
was informed via group discussion that they may be overestimating how comfortable their peers 
are with drinking, another which engaged in non-peer individualistic discussion focused on 
decision-making in a drinking situation. Schroeder and Prentice found that the first group of 
students reported drinking significantly less than the second. In theorizing about how, exactly, 
the first group of students may have been led to drink less, Schroeder and Prentice suggest that in 
drinking situations the former adopted a skeptical attitude with regard to whether their peers’ 
drinking behavior revealed what the latter actually believed about drinking:  
When they saw their peers looking relaxed with, and even amused by, excessive alcohol 
consumption, they knew enough to discount their perceptions. They knew that public 
acquiescence did not necessarily signal private acceptance. Thus, from the outset, these 
students probably experienced little social pressure to conform to local drinking practices 
(p. 1273). 
Thus, it appears that, from how pluralistic ignorance has historically been understood in the 
literature and the distinct consequences that result from believing one’s peers’ views diverge 
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from one’s own, cases of withholding judgement about the attitudes of others in the group should 
not be treated as cases of pluralistic ignorance. 
4 A Defeater-Defeater? 
One might object to my analysis by claiming that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance 
have reason to think that they are not like their peers in relevant respects. So, the fact that they 
are misrepresenting themselves gives them no reason at all to think that others might be doing 
the same. Put differently, my objector might concede that we typically have no reason to doubt 
that we are like other members of our peer group in relevant respects, but insist that subjects in 
states of pluralistic ignorance do have a reason to doubt that they are like everyone else in 
relevant respects. That is, my objector might claim, they are typically in possession of a defeater-
defeater, a reason that removes (defeats) the rationality-defeating power of the original defeater. 
To illustrate, let’s return to the furniture store example. Suppose that just as the sales clerk is 
finished telling me that a red light is shining on the table I’m looking at, a group of her co-
workers walks over to the conversation. While they are all chuckling, one of them speaks up: 
“She’s pulling your leg. She’s been saying that to all of the customers who’ve been looking at 
that table.” This new testimonial evidence serves to defeat the rationality-defeating power of the 
original sales clerk’s testimony. The result is that my belief that the table before me is red, 
formed on the basis of its appearing to be red, is now as rational as it was before I heard the sales 
clerk’s testimony. One might propose that such a situation obtains in standard cases of pluralistic 
ignorance. If so, then pluralistically-ignorant subjects’ beliefs about what others believe can be 
rational after all.  
 What might this defeater-defeater be? One might claim that the agent has a reason to 
think she is unique in relation to her peers. Miller and McFarland (1987, 1991) provide a fairly 
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detailed, experimentally supported, account of the cognition of agents in situations of pluralistic 
ignorance. One of their conclusions is that: 
…people believe that they possess a greater degree of traits that lead to social inhibition 
than does the average other. We proposed that it is people’s belief that they are generally 
more bashful, hesitant, self-conscious, and so on than the average other that leads them to 
infer the situationally specific differences between self and others that constitute 
pluralistic ignorance (Miller and McFarland 1987, p. 300). 
Relatedly, Miller and McFarland (1991, p. 298) say that people generally think they are more 
fearful of embarrassment than the average other. For the sake of specificity, let’s take the 
subject’s uniqueness belief to be the following: 
 FE: Fear of embarrassment is a more potent determiner of my behavior than the behavior 
 of others. 
 Contrary to my proposed analysis, pluralistically-ignorant agents see themselves as unique in 
this way and so don’t take the fact that they are misrepresenting themselves to make it any more 
likely that others might do the same. On this view, they would properly take the fact that other 
people act as if they believe  P to be strong evidence that they do in fact believe  P. Thus, FE 
serves to reinstate the full evidential force of the observed behavior of others by casting doubt on 
propositions like D and on the idea that it is a non-remote possibility that others’ behavior is 
misleading. But if so, then pluralistically-ignorant agents can be epistemically rational in 
believing propositions like B and B2 in light of their observational evidence. As Miller and 
McFarland (1991, p. 298) say, “If people believe that they possess a greater degree of a 
particular trait than does the average other, it seems reasonable for them also to expect that their 
behavior in situations that engage that trait would be different from that of the average other.” 
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Given that subjects believe FE, it is reasonable that they would take the behavior of others at 
ordinary face value and believe that others believe  P. 
 This objection is unsatisfactory, however, for we can ask about the rationality of FE. 
It seems that Miller and McFarland are inclined to say that, given that a subject holds FE, it’s 
reasonable for him or her to take the observed behavior of others (acting as if  P) at ordinary 
face value and believe something like  
 EB: Everyone else but me believes  P. 
The agent would reason that if others believed P, then that belief would be reflected in their 
behavior, given that nothing like FE applies to them. It’s epistemically reasonable to infer EB 
from FE and the observed behavior of others. However, our question is whether FE is believed 
rationally in the first place. If it is not, then subjects are epistemically irrational in believing EB.7 
Miller and McFarland seem to think that FE can be rationally believed. They remark that “people 
have access to more cues pertaining to the presence of internal traits in self than in others.” Or, 
put slightly differently, “…individuals have more data relevant to the existence of internal traits 
in self than in others” (Miller and McFarland 1987, p. 301). In an important sense, then, agents’ 
belief in FE is based on the evidence they have. 
 But Miller and McFarland’s remarks do not show that the belief that FE is rational. While 
the agent’s evidence about their internal traits makes rational their belief that their own behavior 
is in many cases influenced by fear, it does not rationally allow them to form any views 
regarding the extent that fear influences the behavior of others. It certainly does not allow them 
 
7 It’s a fairly uncontroversial constraint on inferentially-justified belief that if one’s belief that P is to be justified on 
the basis of an inference from Q, then Q needs to be justified. Both “inferential internalists” and “inferential 
externalists” agree on this much. 
18 
 
to rule out the possibility that others’ behavior is also in many cases influenced by fear. At most, 
this internal, introspective evidence supports something like 
 FE*: Fear of embarrassment is a potent determiner of my own behavior. 
Thus, the fact that agents’ belief in EB is (typically) based in part on an irrational belief in FE 
implies that their belief in EB is not rational. 
 While the work of Miller and McFarland might be good as a descriptive account of the 
psychology of pluralistically-ignorant agents, it is not adequate as a normative account. Their 
work helps us to see why agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance form the beliefs they do 
about what others believe. But it does not vindicate the epistemic rationality of pluralistically-
ignorant agents. Rather, their work helps us to locate the source of epistemic irrationality in such 
agents. Instead of showing that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance have a defeater for 
their defeater of the belief that everyone else believes  P, Miller and McFarland’s work lends 
credence to the idea that typical agents are epistemically irrational. This is so whether the focus 
is on agents’ belief in FE itself or on their inference to EB on the basis of (in part) FE. 
 One might object that subjects who form the belief that FE, whether or not as a result of 
cognitive biases, are more likely to act in a rational way. If they fear the potential consequences 
of letting others know they believe P, and if they use FE to infer EB, it seems to make sense for 
them to refrain from acting on their actual belief that P. In the College Drinking Case, students 
who believe FE will infer EB and, due to their fear of being considered boring by their peers, 
rationally refrain from displaying their view that drinking is not enjoyable. In other words, 
believing FE ultimately leads to prudentially rational action.8 Further, one might argue that it’s 
 
8 For an argument that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance can be prudentially rational to conceal their belief 
that P, see Bjerring et al. (2014, p. 2463). 
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appropriate for subjects in situations of pluralistic ignorance to belief that FE because doing so 
confers a benefit to the group by increasing social integration. Social integration might occur 
because agents who believe FE (and use it to infer EB) will think their views sharply diverge 
from those of their peers and, thus, will be less likely to spread (what they think is) their deviant 
view to other members of the group.9 In the College Drinking Case, students who believe FE will 
infer EB and, thus, think that nobody else shares their view that drinking is not enjoyable. 
Because of their fear of being considered boring, they will not spread what they take to be a 
deviant view to other members the group. As a result, the current uniform drinking norm of the 
group will remain intact. 
 While I do not deny that there may be cases in which agents’ forming FE would lead to 
prudentially rational action or that agents’ forming FE could lead to increased social integration 
for the group, the focus of this paper has been epistemic rationality, rather than prudential 
rationality. By “epistemic rationality” I have in mind the sort of rationality that one’s belief has 
when it is supported by (and formed on the basis of) one’s evidence. The fact that the belief that 
FE may lead to prudentially rational action, does not entail that that belief is epistemically 
rational. There are many situations in which it’s in an agent’s self-interest to believe something 
that is not supported by her evidence. Likewise, the fact that a widely shared belief increases 
social integration does not imply that the belief is supported by evidence. Further, even if the 
social integration resulting from agents’ believing FE is so beneficial as to be evolutionarily 
advantageous, it still does not mean that FE is supported by agents’ evidence. Some beliefs that 
lead to evolutionary advantages might well be adopted for reasons entirely unrelated to their 
 
9 For a similar idea, see Noelle-Neumann (1974, p. 43). 
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truth-value or epistemic support. 10 But then it’s difficult to maintain the idea that agents’ belief 
that FE must be epistemically rational if it benefits the group. 
5 Is Pluralistic Ignorance Always Epistemically Irrational? 
One might object that I haven’t shown pluralistic ignorance to be an epistemically irrational 
phenomenon because I haven’t shown that all pluralistically-ignorant agents are epistemically 
irrational. Rather, what I’ve shown is merely that standard instances of pluralistic ignorance 
involve epistemically irrational agents. By a “standard instance of pluralistic ignorance,” I mean 
a case that conforms to (PIʹ) and in which the agent’s epistemic position regarding other 
participants’ beliefs is comparable to that of the agents involved in cases commonly discussed in 
the literature on pluralistic ignorance. Now, not all cases of pluralistic ignorance are such. 
Consider a case just like the Classroom Case, except that the instructor starts the lecture by 
stating that the upcoming lecture topic should be easy to understand and that in the last several 
years, every previous student who has heard it had no trouble grasping it. The instructor’s 
statement is false, but seems sincere and accurate. In this case (call it the Deceitful Instructor 
Case), it appears that the student believes rationally that the other students believe the material 
was not hard. Or consider a case in which pluralistically-ignorant agents have evidence for FE. 
Suppose each individual’s therapist has informed them that they are more fearful than the 
average person. In this case (call it the Informative Therapist Case), it would be rational for these 
agents to take the behavior of others at face value and believe that they believe  P; their own 
misleading behavior wouldn’t give them a reason to be suspicious about whether others were 
doing the same.   
 
10 See, e.g., Churchland (1987, p. 548-549). 
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 While it seems reasonable to allow that the above cases are both genuine cases of 
pluralistic ignorance and that agents in such cases may be rational in believing that their peers 
believe  P, such cases differ from what I call standard cases. The cases in the wider literature 
on pluralistic ignorance exclude a significant feature that is present in the current examples. That 
is, standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are such that the only evidence the subject is using to 
form beliefs about what others in the group believe is what the subject can gather on 
introspection and the observation of others’ behavior, perhaps along with some general folk 
psychological assumptions (e.g. that people’s behavior regarding P generally reflects their 
attitude regarding P). But in the Deceitful Instructor Case and the Informative Therapist Case 
there is another source of evidence: the testimony of the professor and therapist, respectively. 
Thus, such cases should not be thought of as standard ones; they are not in the spirit of cases of 
pluralistic ignorance discussed in the literature. Now, I am not in a position to specify in a non-
trivial way what demarcates standard cases from non-standard ones, mainly because it does not 
seem possible to formulate a precise criterion for what counts as admissible background 
knowledge in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance. General beliefs about the kind of thing 
people fear are allowed, but specific beliefs about how fearful one is relative to others are not. 
Beliefs about what the teacher has said are acceptable, except when these beliefs concern a 
misleading statement the teacher made about the difficulty of the material. The task of specifying 
what makes a piece of evidence admissible in a standard case of pluralistic ignorance seems 
hopeless. 
 However, standard cases do appear to differ importantly from non-standard ones. In the 
Deceitful Instructor Case and Informative Therapist Case, the agent’s belief that others believe  
P is clearly rational, and the rationality of this belief has a straightforward explanation: the agent 
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possesses specific evidence warranting her belief. For this reason, the two non-standard cases do 
not raise the kind of puzzle that standard cases generate. Let me elaborate on this point a little 
further. 
 Pluralistic ignorance is commonly treated among those who study it as an undesirable 
state of affairs, one that (other things equal) ought to be dissolved.11 The reason it is treated as 
such is that it often has bad consequences. For example, standard cases often perpetuate 
unpopular social norms. The College Drinking Case illustrates this. While most students prefer 
not to drink, most end up doing so due to the potential social costs of refraining. And this 
drinking behavior further supports the impression that most students prefer drinking, which 
continues to impel students to act contrary to their preferences and engage in behavior that may 
be harmful. By better understanding these cases we might hope to understand more about how to 
keep them from arising and/or dissolve them, thus preventing these bad consequences. My 
arguments against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance, if successful, contribute in a 
modest way to our understanding of the phenomenon by pointing out that pluralistically-ignorant 
agents epistemically err in a particular way. Given that they increase our understanding in this 
way, perhaps they further suggest that efforts to prevent or dissolve situations of pluralistic 
ignorance should address the cognitive biases of those involved. At any rate, since my discussion 
applies to the vast majority of actual cases, very little seems to be lost when it comes to solving 
the real-world problems associated with pluralistic ignorance; a discussion that covered all cases 
(both actual and possible) wouldn’t amount to a significant improvement in this regard. 
6 Conclusion 
 
11 See, e.g., Prentice and Miller (1993, p. 254) and Bicchieri (2006, pp. 193-196). 
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In the course of arguing that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically 
irrational I argued that (PI) neglects an important feature of situations of pluralistic ignorance. 
That is, it ignores the fact that agents in such situations believe that there is a potential social cost 
to acting on their belief that P. I thus proposed (PIʹ), which in turn served as the basis of my 
defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistically-ignorant agents. Miller 
and McFarland’s work, rather than casting doubt on my contention, helped us to locate the 
source of irrationality. My view is not that standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are irrational 
by definition. Rather, I define “standard cases” ostensibly by pointing to the extant literature on 
pluralistic ignorance, which happens to include cases that involve epistemically irrational agents. 
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